The application of Principles-Based Regulation (PBR) to stem cell (SC) research has been adopted with little apparent controversy. However, this was the form of regulation being used in the financial sector leading up to the current financial crisis, giving rise to questions about its ability to regulate fast-moving areas effectively. This article will explore whether PBR is an appropriate form of regulation for SC research. 1 It will conclude that PBR is well-suited to this area, being reflective and facilitative of the process of scientific innovation. However, lessons must be learned from the financial sector about how to apply it effectively.
INTRODUCTION
Regulation cannot cleanse people's souls by making them good instead of bad; but it can make them behave we1J. 2 In the UK, Principles-Based Regulation (PBR) was the regulatory approach being applied by the regulator of the financial sector, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the time leading up to the current global financial crisis. Suggestions have been made that its application by the FSA played a pivotal role in the economic collapse. 3 Nevertheless, PBR remains the regulatory approach of choice for those regulating practitioners in many specialist and professional spheres. To date it has been retained in the oversight of the UK's financial sector-4 with the FSA supplementing it with an intensive supervisory and enforcement approach 5 , although it remains to be seen whether this will continue once the fundamental reform of financial services regulation planned by the coalition government is concluded in 2012. 6 It is also deployed in the supervision of the UK's legal sector, 7 and is growing in popularity in the governance of cutting edge scientific research. 8 In relation to the latter sphere, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has oversight of a particularly dynamic area of research, that of stem cell (SC) research using human embryos and gametes. PBR is being applied to this work under section 8(1)(ca) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended) (the 1990 Act) which requires the HFEA to 'maintain a statement of the general principles which it considers should be followed (i) in the carrying-on of activities governed by this Act, and (ii) in the carrying-out of its functions in relation to such activities'. No information was provided in the Explanatory Notes to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill as it passed through Parliament as to the nature of these principles, their regulatory force or how they should be arrived at. 9 This article asks whether, in light of criticisms of the use of PBR in the financial sector, its application is appropriate in the SC research sphere. It will argue that PBR is particularly well suited to the oversight of SC research, being reflective and facilitative of the process of innovation which is a fundamental element of this work. It overcomes the disadvantages of applying a system of predominantly primary legislative provisions to such a fast-moving area, assisting regulators in making swift and knowledgeable responses to scientific developments whilst leaving scientists with flexibility, within limits, to explore the true potential of their work. However, experience from the financial sector shows that an ineffective application of PBR can lead to the manifestation of serious risks. The HFEA must apply the knowledge learned by the FSA to ensure its continued effective regulation of the SC sphere.
PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION OF INNOVATION
There is no reason why clear fundamental principles cannot overlie well-designed and helpful structures of supporting rules and guidance, with both being appropriately and proportionately enforced. 10 The defining characteristic of PBR is a move from the use of 'detailed, prescriptive rules', such as legislation, to 'high-level, broadly stated rules or Principles' which set standards by which regulated individuals or companies must abide. 11 Regimes governed by such frameworks express both the reason for the principle and the corresponding obligations on those governed by them 12 , allowing the regulator to focus its own mind, as well as the minds of those over whom it presides, on communal goals, thus promoting greater levels of adherence to the purpose of the regulatory requirement. 13 Each new and unanticipated development will be tested against the 'spirit of the rules as well as the letter' 14 with the underlying principle providing a constant reminder to all concerned, whether lay person, researcher or regulator, of the aims of this work.
In the UK financial sector, eleven Principles for Business are used as overarching values against which the actions of those who provide financial services will be tested 15 and from which other rules provided by the regulator are generated. 16 A number of the principles adhered to contain characteristics which are of relevance in the regulation of SC research, such as the requirement on firms to conduct their businesses fairlyl 7 and with due skill, care and diligence 18 ; to treat customers fairly 19 communicate with them effectively 20 and ensure that suitable advice is provided to them. 21 They are general, overarching requirements intended to be 'applied flexibly to a rapidly changing industry', and 'are largely behavioural standards' . 22 In relation to SC research, section 8(1)(ca) of the 1990 Act requires the HFEA to maintain a statement of principles it considers should be followed by those carrying out activities governed by the Act, as well as by the HFEA itself. This requirement caused little disquiet in debates on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill and its terms remained unamended throughout the Bill's passage through Parliament. 23 In anticipation of this impending requirement on it, the HFEA began to draft proposed principles, reviewing those applied by other bodies such as the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the FSA to assist it in this regard. 24 A consultation on the revised Code of Practice, including the Principles, took place between November 2008 and February 2009. Broad support was expressed by trhe respondents to the consultation for the Principles as drafted. 25 The resulting Principles are included within the HFEA's Code of Practice and 'inform the content of the Code rather than serving as its organising architecture' . 26 They are intended to be high-level, broadly stated and self-contained provisions containing qualitative terms as opposed to prescriptive rulesY So, for example, they include requirements to have 'respect for the special status of the embryo when conducting licensed activities', to 'give prospective and current patients and donors sufficient, accessible and up-todate information to enable them to make informed decisions' and to 'ensure that patients and donors have provided all relevant consents before carrying out any licensed activity' . 28 These Principles provide scope for the HFEA to determine whether a new scientific discovery or technique fall within the spirit of the law's aims. 29 Adherence to the Principles will be tested during inspections. 30 
Reflecting and Facilitating the Process of Innovation
The pace of scientific discovery in the field of medical technology is as relentless as it is astounding. Legal and ethical commentators, grappling with the implications of such technologies, have no sooner identified the issues raised by one discovery, than this is complicated or even superseded by the announcement of another development in science's potential to alleviate or cure disease. This is starkly illustrated in the field of SC technology. Here, research is a creative, innovative and unpredictable process. Its very purpose is to push the boundaries of knowledge and possibility, with the aim of treating or eradicating disease. But compare the capricious development of knowledge about SCs with the applicable statutory framework, and an immediate mismatch is evident. 31 Those provisions of the 1990 Act which purport to govern this process are embedded in the scientific knowledge of a given moment and are difficult to amend in light of new discoveries. In an attempt to acknowledge this, recent attempts have been made to re-frame the 1990 Act to provide opportunities for legislators to respond to unanticipated developments through the creation of regulations. However, this is only possible in relation to certain discrete topics. 32 The relative rigidity of this regulatory approach displays a misunderstanding of the process of scientific innovation and means that it is doubtful that the law can remain credible in the face of scientific revelation over time. This mismatch results in an ever-present tension between the purpose of research, striving continually to develop knowledge, and the legal landscape within which it must do so.
For advancement in science and technology to take place, certain practical elements must be in place such as skilled and knowledgeable individuals, requisite equipment and inter-team cooperation.33 However. attempts to innovate also require that researchers have the flexibility to pursue seemingly unfruitful lines of enquiry. Discoveries in the SC field to date illustrate the fundamental feature of innovation which makes it so challenging for legislators to oversee -its unpredictability, both in manner and in outcome. 34 The creation, through Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT), of the first cloned mammal, Dolly the Sheep, 35 is a prime example of innovation in SC science overtaking the law in a manner unanticipated by legislators. At the time Dolly's creation was reported in 1997, S3(3)(d) of the 1990 Act prohibited research which involved replacing the nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo or subsequent development of an embryo, intending to prohibit reproductive cloning. However, the SCNT technique used to create Dolly the sheep involved nuclear substitution of an egg, not an embryo, with the result that an entity created through this technique could be argued to fall outside the statute's definition of an embryo, leaving its use for research or treatment purposes (including reproductive cloning) unregulated. This argument was accepted in a first instance consideration of the issue 36 , leading to the swift introduction of the Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001. 37 The impact of this revelation in the world of SC research was to focus the efforts of many SC scientists on attempts to refine this process. Then, in 2006, a second unanticipated discovery astounded the SC community. Two researchers reported that they had been able to repro gramme adult mouse cells into cells (which they termed 'induced pluripotent stem cells' (iPSCs)) which possessed the defining characteristics of pluripotent embryonic SCs, i.e. the ability to reproduce themselves indefinitely in culture and to differentiate into all the tissues necessary to create a mouse. 38 The implications of this were that embryos may not need to be utilised in SC research, leading to assertions that 'the embryonic stem cell debate is over'. 39 Nothing about this development could have been predicted because, as acknowledged by one of the scientists, Shinya Yamanaka, it came about by chance. When faced with an almost infinite number of gene combinations which could be used to reprogramme adult skin cells to a pluripotent state, Yamanaka made an educated guess, choosing 24 genes which he felt held promise on the basis of the published works of other researchers, acknowledging, 'I was just lucky. I bought the right lottery ticket' . 40 These examples of the ways in which discoveries in the SC field have come about illustrate the magnitude of the challenge for those attempting to establish a regulatory system which accurately anticipates the nature, extent and outcome of scientific innovations. The generality of the principles applied in PBR should mean that the law will not become outdated the moment a new scientific discovery is made. They facilitate effective legal responses to scientific innovation, with their broad terms 'reducing the need for constant amendment, thereby "future proofing" the regulatory requirements' _41 Innovation is unpredictable in terms of trajectory and results. Inappropriately rigid regulation could act as an inhibiting force, preventing the intellectual and experimental processes within which unexpected developments can occur and be explored by the ready minds of those working in the area in the hope that its results will lead to beneficial therapies. PBR can acknowledge and be facilitative of this process, its flexible nature reflecting that of innovation itself.
Overcoming the Disadvantages of Prescriptive Rules
Rigid provisions which are broadly applicable to society as a whole are advantageous where they attempt to control behaviour which indisputably poses harms. Thus, those legislative provisions which prevent me from engaging my Skoda Fabia in a trial of speed on a public highway4 2 can comfortably apply to all those driving at excessive speed with the intention that I and others are not injured by such dangerous behaviour, and acknowledging the fact that in so driving I confer no benefit on other road users or society generally.
These 'prescriptive rules' will however be less accommodating of a fast-moving area where the prediction and identification of potential harms (or where there are disputes about their very existence) is less straightforward. These complexities will be compounded where inherent harms can be offset, as in the SC arena, by the potential benefits to be accrued by engaging in such activities. Such prescriptive rules have been defined as 'anticipatory, generalised abstractions' 43 and are thus necessarily 'simplifications of complex events, objects or courses of behaviour' which will inevitably be or become over-or under-inclusive depending on the context. 44 As a result, they 'remain vulnerable to future discoveries or events that would falsify what had previously been thought to be universal or exclusive truth' , 45 a fundamental weakness where the essence of the area being regulated is its unpredictability.
While not falling into the category of the prescriptive rules used to govern road traffic matters, the 1990 Act has two distinct disadvantages in its attempts to regulate SC research. First, it attempts to be anticipatory, an attempt which, experience in SC research shows, will only succeed for a finite period of time in the face of relentless innovation. Secondly, it is a primary legislative provision which by its very nature is not easily susceptible to amendment. Prescriptive rules can therefore 'lead to gaps, inconsistencies, rigidity and are prone to . . . the need for constant adjustment to new situations and to the ratchet syndrome, as more rules are created to address new problems or close new gaps, creating more gaps and so on' . 46 Attempts have been made to "future-proof' provisions in the amended version of the 1990 Act through the insertion of regulation-making provisions. These are available in those areas where past experience indicates that the law may become outdated in the face of scientific developments. For example, section 1 ( 6) of the 1990 Act enables regulations to provide that the statute's definition of "embryo', 'eggs', 'sperm' or 'gametes' includes things specified in the regulations which would otherwise not fall within the definition' . 47 However, the hybrid approach of using primary legislation with provisions for amendment is not entirely satisfactory in the long term. Extensive amendment of these definitions over time may lead to the true position of the law bearing no relation to its primary statutory terms. In addition, there is no guarantee that the regulation-making provisions will apply to the next SC discovery. Consider the following example in which the reader is requested to suspend their disbelief. Imagine a scientist attempting to develop a SC therapy to overcome heart disease. She has decided to use iPSCs in this attempt and has discovered a way to stimulate her own skin cells to transform into a functioning adult heart within a matter of moments. Delighted, she clocks off early to celebrate her success. What she does not know is that the method she has developed is not a method to create a heart in isolation. It is the ability to trigger the spontaneous growth of a whole human being beginning with the heart. The next morning she returns to find that from that heart, other elements of the body have begun to develop. Lungs have sprouted, veins and arteries filter from both. This process continues until a living adult humanoid, similar in nature to its progenitor, lies on the laboratory bench. Neither egg, embryo, sperm or gamete have been used in its creation but we may have concerns about whether such processes should remain beyond the scrutiny of the law. This example may be subjected to the criticism that it is beyond the bounds of reality, but in the not too distant past, the creation of a mammal through SCNT was similarly inconceivable. The intention here is to demonstrate that the law needs to strike a balance between certainty and its own ability over time to regulate its ostensible subject matter effectively. PBR can aid it in this regard.
As a mechanism for the regulation of rapidly-moving technologies, primary legislation has its supporters on the basis that 'the elaborate and lengthy political and legal process which resulted in Parliament passing the 1990 Act lent legitimacy and authority to the law' . 48 In addition, it is argued that the 1990 Act does provide 'the institutional and legal framework in which new problems can be debated and resolved as they arise' . 49 The utilisation of primary legislation as a regulatory mechanism for this area was understandable in 1990. Its introduction of a legal framework to govern an area giving rise to a great deal of moral and legal controversy could be justified at that time on the basis of the reassurance it gave to the public that appropriately rigorous oversight of embryonic research and reproductive technology was in place. Two decades later however, and with the permissibility of such research and treatment being well established, it is right to supplement this with a more flexible regulatory mechanism.
The response of the law to the emergence of SCNT suggests that the 1990 Act was too cumbersome to deal with the new issue in both a timely and thorough way. The lengthy parliamentary process leading to the enactment of the changes to the 1990 Act illustrates that amendments to primary legislation to deal with these are unlikely to be undertaken quickly enough to clarify the situation of those affected, illustrating again the mismatch between legislation and the fluidity of innovation. If changes to primary legislation were made quickly, they would be subject to criticisms of lack of consideration of both the implications of the technology and of the views of interested groups. Supplementing the 1990 Act with the application of PBR however can assist in maintaining the credibility of the law in the face of scientific advances.
Despite the limits of primary legislation as the sole means of the regulation of SC technology, prescriptive rules can still have a role to play, even within PBR. 50 While PBR can provide flexibility in regulation, rules may be used at the fringes of SC research regulation to set the boundaries beyond which such research should not stray and therefore over which society requires closer regulatory oversight, and to aid interpretation and compliance. 51 This would involves determining where the greatest risks, whether moral or other, lie. Such legislation must be subject to regular review to confirm its continued relevance. Issues of safety and quality are also likely to require continued oversight to provide reassurance to the public. However, other uncertainties in knowledge about the science may be clarified over time. So, for example, a provision that no iPSCs may be tested in humans until concerns about their safety are allayed may become obsolete once science discovers ways to de-differentiate adult cells to a pluripotent state without the introduction of additional genes or viruses. The regulatory mechanism of 'sunsetting', in which rules are allowed to lapse once their purpose has been served, would be particularly appropriate to scientific research given its uncertainties and the fast moving pace of technology. 52 Its advantages include making sure legislation is reviewed, allowing even prescriptive rules to take into account emerging knowledge about a given area of technology. 53 Once science and society have moved on from a particular quandary, out-dated legislation can be withdrawn. 54 
Enhancing the Credibility of Purposive Interpretation
PBR has a further advantage in that it facilitates a uniform application of the law by both regulator and the courts. The courts have used purposive reasoning to establish the extent of the law's application to new technologies. 55 An inherent problem in doing so is that they may be tempted to make use of legal fictions to demonstrate the law's applicability in a given case. In the Quintavalle therapeutic cloning case for example, it is arguable that a legal fiction was used to categorise embryos created by SCNT as having been created by a process of fertilisation, so that the aims of the 1990 Act, to regulate the use of human embryos no matter what their manner of creation, were met. 56 This approach has advantages in the regulation of fast-moving technologies, but, in the absence of reference to a clear guiding framework of principles, such reasoning can lack robustness. Unless purposive reasoning is applied in the context of such a framework which includes an account of the law's goals in regulating the area, those goals may not be achieved. PBR overcomes this challenge through its use of principles which reflect the aims of the regulation and guide the actions of all those involved in this area of work. It allows the courts (and regulator) to continue to apply purposive reasoning, but this will be informed by well identified benchmarks.
The Government has in the past indicated a reluctance to introduce too flexible a legal regime for the oversight of embryo research on the basis that it would lead to a lack of accountability and certainty, 57 and being concerned to avoid the perceived consequent danger of an increased exposure to litigation and judicial review. 58 However, accountability mechanisms can be built in to the PBR system and, with a cohesive and predictable approach being adopted by both courts and regulators, challenges to the latter's decisions through the courts should not be overwhelming. It is unlikely, whatever regulatory approach is adopted, that legal challenges to the decisions of regulators could be avoided in their entirety. The court can continue to play a useful interpretive role in SC regulation, being able to avail itself of arguments based in principle and remaining the arbiter in cases of dispute in the HFEA's application of PBR, assessing the legality of its decision in a predictable manner by way of reference to the principles. If the attempt to avoid such challenges leads to a restrictive regulatory approach, the wrong balance has been struck between regulating this arena and attempting to permit SC research to be undertaken. Where the courts (as well as regulators) have a clear framework within which to make their decisions, this will provide more predictability of their determinations and a staving off of unmeritworthy claims, whilst providing a flexible regulatory arena for researchers.
AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF PBR Lessons from the Financial Sector
The HFEA is fortunate in having the experience of the FSA to relate to as an apposite example of how to avoid ineffective regulation using PBR. The House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee has argued that not all of the regulatory lessons learned from the financial crisis would be relevant to other sectors. Aspects such as 'the complexity of the financial sector, the global nature of the sector, the nature of corporate and personal incentives, and the consequences of failure' 59 were considered to be unique to this sector. However, while the scale of the implications of a regulatory failure of SC research may not be as extensive as its financial counterpart, the scientific arena, with its global collaborations, the highly specialised and technical nature of the work, the potential personal and professional rewards for success and the implications for patients and society if its aims are not met or laws not abided by, has many similarities. Important lessons must therefore be learned about regulatory failures from the world of finance. Perhaps most importantly, the HFEA must be conscious of the fact that 'regulators need to be agile and adaptive ' . 60 This is particularly the case in relation to those areas where innovation is regularly occurring.
Some of the factors leading to the financial crisis were driven by issues other than an ineffective application of PBR. For example, Lord Turner identified one of the aspects leading to the global financial crisis as being 'financial market innovation' i.e. growth and change in the value and nature of credit securities available.6' Further, the tripartite regulatory system involving the Treasury, the FSA and the Bank of England lacked 'a clear leadership structure or a strategy for effective communication with the public' . 62 In addition, those who work within a PBR scheme must bear significant responsibility for their adherence or lack of it to the applicable regulatory framework. For example, the directors of Northern Rock have been identified as the principal culprits in its downfall in September 2007 having 'pursued a reckless business model'. 63 However, heavy criticism was also directed at the FSA which 'systematically failed in its regulatory duty to ensure that Northern Rock would not pose a systemic risk' , 64 by taking inadequate steps to deal with its flawed funding model, 65 failing to communicate its concerns effectively to the bank, 66 and permitting the appointment to executive level within the bank of two inadequately qualified individuals. 67 In addition, in order to regulate effectively, regulators require 'better understanding of regulated organisations, the incentives that drive them, and the consequences of their behaviours'. 68 The FSA was found to have had an insufficient knowledge of the workings of the institutions it regulated and an inability to retain high-grade staff. 69 The HFEA must therefore maintain effective mechanisms of communication with its licensees, assisted in this regard by a specialist knowledge of its regulatory subject matter.
The FSA was advised to target increased resources at high impact and large banks, and focus, inter alia, 'on business models, strategies, risks and outcomes, rather than primarily on systems and processes [and] ... on technical skills as well as probity of approved persons' as well as requiring more intensive information from banks of key areas of risk. 70 The HFEA has indicated its intentions to focus on qualitative assessments of compliance, but would be assisted in this regard by the supplementation of its principles by a clear pronouncement of the goals of the regulatory framework.
Commenting on regulatory approaches in the light of the financial crisis, the House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee noted that 'there is scope for regulators better to understand both individuallevel risk and use their powers of enforcement more effectively' . 71 In relation to the latter aspect in the financial sector, 'failings in effective implementation of existing rules led to over-confidence in the ability of regulation to do its job' . 72 Firms were not having due regard to the applicable principles, and enforcement of them was inadequate. It is in relation to the element of enforcement that the HFEA will face its most significant challenges. It is currently hampered in effective and timely enforcement by cumbersome legal requirements. 73 As a result its response to breaches of regulation is 'long-winded', there is an apparent reluctance to make use of the full spectrum of sanctions available to it, and the enforcement and compliance guidance lacks clarity 74 (although this may be improved on the HFEA's obtaining of permission to utilise alternative sanctions under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008). 75 It is therefore advised to make more use of unannounced inspections in order to obtain a more accurate impression of compliance with licensing requirements. 76 The need for increased regulatory co-ordination at a global level has been noted 'to provide better co-ordinated supervision of the world's largest financial services firms' . 77 The proposals made here focus on the regulation of SC research in England. However, any regulatory framework governing this area must not ignore the fact that SC research is now a global enterprise. 78 The rejection of a rigid system of regulation will, it is hoped, contribute to achieving international consensus by providing more flexibility for a PBR approach to be adapted within other jurisdictions which have differing values, even if this does not extend beyond voluntary codes of conduct adhered to by the scientific community in their collaborations.
Goals-Based Approach
PBR allows the regulator to focus its own mind, as well as the minds of those over whom it presides, on underlying communal goals and values in pursuing SC research, and to adapt to changes in the focus of such goals, allowing 'a greater degree of substantive compliance with the purpose' of governing provisions. 79 One of the difficulties in SC research is identifying and agreeing on what the values, and collective goals flowing from them, are. Although, to date, the aims of the regulation of SC research have not been set out with sufficient clarity, one of the apparent aims of the government in regulating this sphere has been to achieve a 'social utility aim', that is, the facilitation of advances in the treatment of serious disease in order to benefit individuals and society. 80 The aims of the amendments to the 1990 Act were 'to take account of scientific developments, to reflect changes in societal attitudes and to update the HFEA's ability to regulate according to principles of better regulation' . 81 It cannot be stated with any conviction though that these are collective goals in the sense that their pursuit has been agreed to by all interested or affected groups in society. The SC research arena is characterised by ongoing disagreements about whether or not research which utilises and destroys embryos should be permitted. Clear statements of the purpose underlying the decision to permit it within law should therefore be made. As a first step in the regulation of this area, asking the question, "What is the law attempting to achieve in its involvement in this area?" is necessary, and it is this question which PBR can help to answer where it includes a clear account of the goals of this work. The HFEA should therefore include in its statement of Principles an account of the aims of those provisions. Possessed of the knowledge that purposive reasoning will be applied by the courts, an account by legislators and regulators of the purpose behind the regulatory framework will assist in maintaining the law's coherence. CONCLUSION PBR is a regulatory approach which is reflective and facilitative of the process of scientific innovation. It overcomes the identified disadvantages of a predominant regulatory focus on prescriptive rules and provides guidance to regulators, the courts and researchers alike on the aims of SC research. In providing a series of broad principles according to which the actions of regulatees can be tested, it has the capacity to maintain its credibility in the face of the dynamism of the SC world. Crucially, it can incorporate mechanisms to deal with the many and varied ethical issues to which such research gives rise.
For those who consider SC research to be acceptable, identifying a firm set of principles for conduct helps to highlight those researchers who are not conforming to agreed values within the area and importantly plays a role in the prevention of such breaches. Such agreement may also promote collaboration and co-operation amongst professionals and help to obtain the trust and support of the public 82 leading to advancements in science and a resulting improvement in overall standards of health. Finally, the application of principles in this area may provide a sound basis for the development of future international regulation or, at the least, co-operation in compliance with voluntary codes of conduct. This is more likely to be achievable where the foundation of the regulatory system is not anchored in prescriptive rules-based approaches which arise out of the approach of a specific jurisdiction.
